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INTRODUCTION
This article provides an update of a comprehensive review that
the published five years ago, which synthesized the various sources
of law specific to the remedial authority of hearing/review officers
(H/ROs) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).' The publisher of the ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW, which
contained the original version, provided permission for the updated
publication here.
The IDEA is a funding act that dates back to 1975.2 The
primary purpose of the IDEA is to provide a free appropriate public
education (FAPE) to each child with a disability3 in the least
restrictive environment (LRE).4 The vehicle for determining and
delivering FAPE in the LRE is an individualized education program
(IEP).5
The cornerstone for resolving disputes between parents and
1. Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 401
(2006).
2. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2009). The Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) was originally named the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (the Act). § 1400(c)(2). Congress reauthorized the Act several times,
with successive refinements. The 1990 reauthorization included the name change
to the IDEA. For a comprehensive comparison of the 1986 reauthorization, § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
see Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA and Section 504/ADA, 178 EDUC.
L. REP. 629 (2003). The implementing regulations for the IDEA are at 34 C.F.R.
pt. 300 (2009). The most recent reauthorization, signed by President Bush on
December 3, 2004, went into effect, in relevant part, on July 1, 2005. With limited
exceptions, see infra note 12, the reauthorization did not materially change the
statutory provisions that provide the basis for the analysis in this Article.
3. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (setting forth six purposes of the IDEA). A
free appropriate public education (FAPE) consists of special education and related
services designed to address the needs of the individual eligible child. § 1401(8);
see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.17(c) (2009) (specifying that FAPE means services that
"[i]nclude preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education").
4. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114-.117 (requiring that
children with disabilities be educated, within a broad continuum of placements,
with nondisabled children to the maximum extent appropriate).
5. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(11), 1414(d); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.22, 300.320-
.321 (2009) (defining an individualized educational program (IEP) team and
delineating the content of an IEP).
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districts as to eligibility, FAPE, and other issues under the IDEA, is
an impartial administrative adjudication conducted by a
hearing/review officer (H/RO).6 The IDEA gives states the choice of
having a one-tiered system, consisting solely of an impartial due
process hearing, or a two-tiered system, which includes an additional
officer level review.7 Subsequent to exhausting this administrative
adjudication, the aggrieved party has the right to judicial review in
state or federal court.8 The IDEA accords judges the authority to
award attorneys' fees in specified circumstances9 and, without further
specification, requires them to grant "such relief as the court
determines is appropriate."' 0  The IDEA and its regulations,"
however, are largely silent about the remedial authority of the
impartial H/ROs.12
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (providing the
procedures for instituting an impartial due process hearing). The other dispute
resolution mechanism, which is purely administrative and without judicial review,
is the state complaint resolution process. §§ 300.151-.153; see generally Perry A.
Zirkel, Legal Boundaries for the IDEA Complaint Resolution Process, 237 EDUC.
L. REP. 565 (2008). Mediation is also available as an adjunct to the hearing/review
officer process. § 300.506.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)-(g); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.514(b), 300.516
(indicating situations in which appeal or civil action may be available). A
gradually decreased number of states (currently, 10) have a second, review-officer
tier, with the remaining 34 states opting for a one-tier, state-level hearing officer
system. Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala. Due Process Hearing Systems under the
IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 3 (2010). This
survey also revealed a gradual trend toward full-time ALJs at the first tier. Id.
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(a) (stating that a party
may bring a claim in a "district court of the United States without regard to the
amount in controversy").
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.517 (requiring that the fees
be reasonable).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(c)(3). For a recent
analysis of the boundaries for a court's remedial authority under the IDEA, see
Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 520 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2008).
11. In contrast to the silence regarding hearing/review officers (H/ROs), the
regulations explicitly provide the state complaint process, which is the alternate
administrative dispute resolution mechanism, with express remedies, including
expense reimbursement and compensatory education. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.141(b)(1).
12. There are limited exceptions. The first is an injunction, analogous to the
judicial authority construed in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 (1988), to change
the placement of the child on an interim basis in narrowly specified, danger-based
3
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In the expansive litigation under the IDEA,13 courts have
exercised various traditional forms of relief, primarily in the form of
the injunction-based, specialized equitable remedies of tuition
reimbursement 4 and compensatory education.'s In contrast, the
disciplinary circumstances. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2). In contrast with the provision
allocating to the IEP team the determination of the other interim placements, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.531, the hearing officer's authority for
Honig-type situations appears to be injunctive, rather than merely declaratory,
relief. The 2004 IDEA reauthorization deleted the criteria for such interim
placements, suggesting that the hearing officer is not limited to the district
proposal. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(B)(ii). A second limited exception is the
declaratory or injunctive authority, unless inconsistent with state law, to override a
refusal of parental consent to an initial evaluation or re-evaluation. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(a)(1)(C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(3)(i), 300.300(c)(2)(ii). With regard to
initial services, however, the 2004 IDEA reauthorization codified the administering
agency's interpretation that hearing officers lack such overriding authority for
parental refusals of consent. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)); see also Letter to
Manasevit, 41 IDELR 1 36, at 201 (OSEP 2003); Letter to Gagliardi, 36 IDELR
267, at 1161 (OSERS 2001); Letter to Cox, 36 IDELR 66, at 282 (OSEP 2001)
(noting that the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Special Education
Programs (OSEP) interpreted the IDEA as permitting the overriding of parental
refusal only with regard to evaluations). Third and most significantly, the IDEA
specifically grants not only judges, but also hearing officers the authority to issue
tuition reimbursement; however, in odd partial contradiction, the IDEA limits the
equitable step to "a judicial finding of unreasonableness." 20 U.S.C. §§
1412(a)(10)C)(ii) and 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) (emphasis added); see also 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.148(d)(3)) (implementing the reimbursement limitation). In its recent ruling
regarding tuition reimbursement, the Supreme Court incidentally rejected the
defendant-district's argument that asserted that the broad remedial authority
expressly granted to courts (supra note 10 and accompanying text) contradicted
this specific remedial authority granted to hearing officers. Forest Grove Sch. Dist.
v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 n. 11 (2009). Finally, in limiting the hearing
officer's authority to find a denial of FAPE on circumscribed, basically prejudicial
procedural violations, the 2004 IDEA reauthorization expressly recognized a
hearing officer's authority to order a district to comply with the Act's pertinent
procedural requirements. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(e)(E)); see also 34 C.F.R. §§
300.148(c) and 300.148(d)(3) (mirroring this provision).
13. See Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D'Angelo, Special Education Case Law:
An Empirical Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. L. REP. 731 (2002) (tracing trends in
special education case law at the administrative level and published court
decisions).
14. See Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Tuition
Reimbursement Claims: An Empirical Analysis, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC.
350 (2001) (analyzing case law in reference to the Burlington-Carter test for
tuition reimbursement).
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courts are divided as to whether the IDEA, with or without § 1983,16
allows for the legal remedy of money damages." But what have the
15. See Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education Services: An Annotated
Update of the law, 251 EDUC. L. REP. 501 (2010) (canvassing the case law
concerning compensatory education); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Two Competing
Approaches for Calculating Compensatory Education under the IDEA, 257 EDUC.
L. REP. 550 (2010) (explaining the case law concerning the quantitative and
qualitative approached to calculate compensatory education); Perry A. Zirkel,
Compensatory Education Under the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 110 PENN.
ST. L. REv. 181 (2006) (arguing for more consistency between analogous
approaches for compensatory education and tuition reimbursement).
16. See infra note 169 (explaining that the appropriate avenue to enforce an
H/RO order is in court via a § 1983 action). For related articles, see, for example,
Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar: Section 1983 Damage Claims in Special
Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L. REV. 405 (2001); Ralph D. Mawdsley, A Section
1983 Cause ofAction Under IDEA? Measuring the Effect ofGonzaga University v.
Doe, 170 EDUC. L. REP. 425 (2002).
17. Compare A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007)
(reversing the Third Circuit's position, which had previously permitted
compensatory damages under the IDA via § 1983), Diaz-Fonseca v.
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006) (interpreting the IDEA
as not providing money damages), Ortega v. Bibb County Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d
1321 (1lth Cir. 2005) (rejecting the availability of tort-like relief under IDEA as
inconsistent with its purpose as a social-welfare mechanism to provide appropriate
educational services), Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2002)
(discussing the situation in which awarding money damages is the only way to
compensate for the grievance from the situation in which the injured party failed to
timely pursue effective remedies), Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th
Cir. 2000) (opining that, even if damages are available under the IDEA, they
should be awarded in a judicial forum and not in an administrative hearing),
Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998)
(denying compensatory damages because neither general nor punitive damages are
available under the IDEA), Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting the argument that compensatory and punitive damages should be
awarded because the violation of IDEA amounted to educational malpractice), and
Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting money damages
as inconsistent with the IDEA's structure of elaborate provision for educational
services), with Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 248 F. Supp. 2d
936, 939 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (deducing congressional intent to provide a plaintiff with
recovery under § 1983 for violations of the IDEA), Zearley v. Ackerman, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D.D.C. 2000) (joining the Third Circuit's previous position that
there is an implied right of action for monetary damages for § 1983 claims
premised on IDEA violations), and L.C. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 57 F. Supp. 2d
1214 (D. Utah 1999) (granting money damages under the IDEA, as well as under §
1983, for violation of due process rights provided under the IDEA). The case law
5
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courts and other sources of legal authority delineated as the
boundaries for H/ROs' remedial authority?
The purpose of this Article is to provide an updated demarcation
of the legal basis and boundaries of H/ROs' remedial authority under
the IDEA and correlative state special education laws.'8 The sources
for this synthesis are pertinent court decisions, published H/RO
decisions, and interpretations of the Department of Education's
Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) to date.19 The scope
of this Article, however, does not extend to the related issues of the
deference accorded to20 or by 21 H/ROs under the IDEA; H/ROs'
is limited and similarly split with regard to punitive damages. Compare T.B. v.
Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR 67, at 265 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (analogizing the
funding conditions of the IDEA to a contract and noting that punitive damages are
not available in breach of contract cases), and Appleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Benson,
32 IDELR 91, at 284 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (finding that punitive damages are not
available under IDEA), with Irene B. v. Phila. Acad. Charter Sch., 38 IDELR
183, at 738 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (allowing a claim for punitive damages against an
individual), and Woods v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 796 F. Supp. 767, 776 (D.N.J.
1992) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) and citing Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass.
Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985)) (holding that the IDEA authorized punitive
damages, based on the language that the court may "grant such relief as [it]
determines is appropriate").
18. The scope of this Article does not extend to the remedial authority of
H/ROs under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. For one of the rare examples of
applicable authority, see Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 38 IDELR 235, at 941 (N.M.
SEA 2002).
19. The primary publication for H/RO decisions (designated in the citations as
"SEA" inasmuch as the state education agency is responsible for the H/RO system)
and Department of Education's Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP)
interpretations is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report (IDELR)
and its predecessor, the Education of the Handicapped Law Report (EHLR). The
representativeness of the IDELR's sampling of H/RO decisions is subject to
question. See Anastasia D'Angelo, Gary Lutz & Perry A. Zirkel, Are Published
IDEA Hearing Officer Decisions Representative?, 14 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD.
241 (2004) (examining previous hearing officer decisions under IDEA to determine
whether they were representative of the outcomes and frequency of published and
unpublished opinions). For the extent of authority of OSEP letters, see Perry
Zirkel, Do OSEP Policy Letters Have Legal Weight? 171 EDUC. L. REP. 391
(2002).
20. See James Newcomer & Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of the Judicial
Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 469 (1999)
(tracking court cases concerning special education disputes under the
administrative and judicial venues).
21. In general, H/ROs and courts defer to school districts in staff and
31-1
impartiality22 or, to the extent that it does not directly intertwine with
remedial authority,23 H/ROs' jurisdiction 24 under the IDEA; the
statute of limitations for filing for a first- or second-tier
administrative proceeding under the IDEA; 25 or hearing officers'
remedial authority under § 504.26 Moreover, the boundaries of this
methodology selection cases. See, e.g., Perry Zirkel, Know Legal Boundaries with
Student Evaluation Provisions, 17 THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR 3 (2002); Perry Zirkel,
Do School Districts Typically Win Methodology Cases, 13 SPECIAL EDUCATOR 11
(1997); Tara Skibitsky Levinson & Perry Zirkel, Parents vs. Districts in Selecting
the Psychologist: Who Wins?, 30 COMMUNIQUt 10 (2001) (available from the
Nat'l Ass'n of Sch. Psychologists).
22. See Peter J. Maher & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality of Hearing and Review
Officers under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 83 N. DAKOTA L.
REV. 109 (2007) (updating the Drager & Zirkel article via a checklist format);
Elaine A. Drager & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 86 EDUC. L. REP. 11 (1993) (synthesizing legal
boundaries of impartiality under the IDEA).
23. See, e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 432 v. J.H., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Minn.
1998) (invalidating a hearing officer order for lack of jurisdiction); Bd. of Educ. of
Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 337, 340 (N.Y. SEA 1998) (upholding by
review officer of a hearing officer's determination of retained jurisdiction to
implement his own injunction). Jurisdiction and remedial authority are overlapping
rather than mutually exclusive topics. Thus, the boundary for is inevitably blurry
as to which legal authority to include herein.
24. For cases dealing with jurisdiction of H/ROs, see for example Va. Office
of Prot. & Advocacy v. Virginia, 262 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Va. 2003); P.N. v.
Greco, 282 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.N.J. 2003); Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 241 F.
Supp. 2d 111 (D.N.H. 2003); Bd. of Educ. of Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 27
IDELR 996, 999 (N.Y. SEA 1998); cf Bd. of Educ. v. Johnson, 534 F. Supp. 2d
231 (D. Del. 2008) (ruling that H/ROs lack remedial authority to order services to
parentally placed private school students beyond district's limited IDEA's
obligations to such students).
25. For application of the statute of limitations that the 2004 amendments
expressly included in the IDEA for the first time, see, e.g., Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks
Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the IDEA's two-year statute
of limitations applies to claims predating passage of the IDEA); D.C. v. Klein
Indep. Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 793 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (applying the different
statute of limitations that the IDEA allows under state law). For a synthesis of this
topic prior to the 2004 amendments, see Perry A. Zirkel & Peter J. Maher, The
Statute of Limitations Under the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 175 EDUC. L.
REP. 1 (2003) (surveying cases in which courts or H/ROs have established statutes
of limitations under the IDEA via the borrowing analogy).
26. To date, there is negligible authority specific to this subject. For a
comprehensive source that includes hearing officer decisions under § 504, see
Spring 2011 The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers 7
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Article are limited to the scope of the H/ROs' remedial authority, not
to the standards they use to reach remedies. 27 Finally, this Article
only addresses H/ROs' remedial authority as a result of, not during,28
the prehearing and hearing process.
To a large extent, the pertinent legal authorities treat the remedial
authority of H/ROs as derived from and largely commensurate with
the remedial authority of the courts. 29 The following Parts of this
Article delineate the specific boundaries of this derived remedial
authority in special education cases with respect to each of the major
categories of relief-declaratory, injunctive, and monetary-in this
Perry A. Zirkel, § 504, THE ADA, AND THE SCHOOLS (2d ed. 2000).
27. For sources that do explore these issues, see Mayes & Zirkel, supra note
14; Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education Services Under the IDEA: An
Annotated Update, 190 EDUC. L. REP. 745 (2004).
28. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.512(a)(3) and 300.512(b)(1) (2009) (enforcing
a five-day rule for evidence, including evaluations); § 300.502(d) (ordering an
independent educational evaluation "as part of the hearing"); S.T. ex rel. S.F. v.
Sch. Bd. of Seminole County, 783 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(concerning authority to order discovery).
29. See, e.g., Cocores v. Portsmouth, 779 F. Supp. 203, 205 (D.N.H. 1991)
(quoting S-1 v. Spangler, 650 F. Supp. 1427, 1431 (M.D.N.C. 1986), vacated as
moot, 832 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1987)) ("It seems incongruous that Congress intended
the reviewing court to maintain greater authority to order relief than the hearing
officer. . .. "); Ivan P. v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 865 F. Supp. 74, 80 (D. Conn.
1994); cf Hesling v. Avon Grove Sch. Dist., 428 F. Supp. 2d 262, 273 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (commenting that "[t]he case law is clear that various forms of equitable
relief, including the issuance of a declaratory judgment, can be obtained through
the IDEA's administrative proceedings"). Among IDEA H/ROs, the leading,
perhaps only, exception to this broad derivative view is the state of Florida, where
some of the hearing officers have interpreted Florida law, including its constitution
and case law, as precluding their remedial authority with regard to tuition
reimbursement and compensatory education. E-mail from John VanLaningham,
Administrative Law Judge, Florida Office of Adminstrative Hearings, to Perry A.
Zirkel, Professor, Lehigh University, Oct. 2, 2010 11:47:30 (on file with the
author). The Eleventh Circuit avoided determining whether hearing officers may
have less remedial authority than courts with regard to tuition reimbursement,
concluding that the issue was not justiciable in the absence of a hearing officer's
finding that the parent met the criteria for this remedy. L.M.P. v. Florida Dep't of
Educ., 345 F. App'x 248 (11th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court's recent
clarification, in Forest Grove, that reinforces the remedial authority of H/ROs
(supra note 12) and Florida's recent legislation that seems to provide a reminder of
federal preemption (FLA. STAT. § 1003.571(1) (2009) (requiring the state board of
education to comply with the IDEA) may mitigate or eliminate this state-specific
restrictive remedial interpretation.
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order of approximately ascending strength. When the applicable
source-court, H/RO, or OSEP-addresses multiple forms of relief, I
categorize the decision as the strongest relief except when there is
separate treatment of each remedy.
I. HIRO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE DECLARATORY RELIEF
It is undisputed that an H/RO has authority to determine (1)
whether a student is covered under one or more of the eligibility
classifications of the IDEA, 30 (2) whether a district's evaluation
and/or the parents' independent educational evaluation (IEE) is
appropriate, 31 and (3) whether a student's program and placement are
appropriate. 32 Thus far, the legal limitations on an H/RO's authority
to issue declaratory relief with respect to these questions have been
scant. Courts have, however, restricted H/ROs' authority to issue
declaratory relief with respect to the following issues.
First, accompanying its even more puzzling general
proscription,33 a federal district court in the District of Columbia
appears to have limited an H/RO's ability to address a parent's
30. 34 C.F.R § 300.507(a)(1). For the eligibility classifications, see id. §
300.8(c).
31. 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(1). For short and comprehensive syntheses,
respectively, of the IEE reimbursement remedy, which is injunctive relief that
included this determination at the threshold step, see Perry A. Zirkel, Independent
Educational Evaluations at District Expense under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 38 J.L. & EDuc. 323 (2009); Perry A. Zirkel, Independent
Educational Evaluation Reimbursements: A Checklist, 231 EDUC. L. REP. 21
(2008). For the regulations specific to IEEs, see § 300.502. For the separable IHO
authority to issue an injunction for an IEE during the hearing, see supra note 28.
32. 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(1). For the FAPE and placement regulations, see
§§ 300.17, .104, .115-.116. On occasion, the H/RO waffles on the yes-no issue of
appropriateness. See Lampeter Strasburg Sch. Dist., 43 IDELR 17, at 58 (Pa.
SEA 2005) ("[T]he IEP is appropriate for what it is .... But it is wholly
lacking .... It is not necessarily inappropriate, but it is only marginally
appropriate.").
33. S.G. v. Dist. of Columbia, 498 F. Supp. 2d 304, 313 (D.D.C. 2007) (ruling
that the IDEA does not provide for declaratory relief). The court cited its earlier
decision in Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 329 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C.
2004), which indeed included this pronouncement but only in cryptic application to
a requested injunction for an unripe controversy, thus inferably referring to the
general unavailability of advisory opinions).
9
10 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
proposed placement when the child is still in the district's placement,
as distinguished from a tuition reimbursement case in which the
parent has unilaterally placed their child in a private placement.
Specifically, in Davis v. District of Columbia Board of Education,
the court ruled that when the child is still in the district's placement,
hearing officers do not have the authority to issue declaratory relief,
much less injunctive relief specific to the appropriateness of the
parent's proposed alternative placement. 34 According to this court, in
said context, an H/RO is limited to declaring whether the placement
that the district has offered is appropriate. 35  If the H/RO's
determination is that said placement is inappropriate, the Davis
interpretation requires the hearing officer to remand the issue to the
IEP team to develop an appropriate placement. 36 In rejecting the
plaintiff-parent's reliance on an OSEP policy letter that adopted a
contrary interpretation, 37 however, the court relied on a consent
decree that is specific to the District of Columbia.38
Perhaps due to the early date39 and the limiting legal context40 of
Davis, most H/ROs-and courts41-have ignored the Davis ruling.
34. 530 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 (D.D.C. 1982).
35. Id. at 1211.
36. The court added that the hearing officer "may, and indeed, should" make a
recommendation for an appropriate program or placement. Id. at 1212.
37. Letter to Eig, EHLR 211:174 (OSEP 1980) ("Where 'appropriate'
placement is at issue, the hearing officer's scope of authority includes deciding
what placement would be appropriate for that child."). In contrast, the Department
of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) recognized the local limitation of the
Mills consent decree in reaching a less broad, but perhaps intermediate,
interpretation. Dist. of Columbia Pub. Sch., EHLR 257:208 (OCR 1981).
38. Davis, 530 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
39. For example, this decision pre-dated the Supreme Court's landmark FAPE
decision in Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
40. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
41. Indeed, in a recent case the same court not only declared, but also ordered
the parents' proposed placement, albeit under the rubric of compensatory
education. Diatta v. Dist. of Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2004). In
doing so, the court ruled that the hearing officer's denial of the education program
requested by the parent constituted an abdication of his authority. Id. at 65; see
also Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp. 860 (D.N.H. 1992)
(ordering the district to implement the parents' proposed placement). For an early
exception to the modem trend, see Hendry County Sch. Bd. v. Kujawski, 408 So.
2d 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), which overruled the hearing officer's sua sponte
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Rather, most H/ROs have routinely considered the appropriateness of
a parental proposal in which the H/ROs declare that the district's
placement is inappropriate. 42
A second and more generally accepted limitation is that H/ROs
typically decline to declare which side is the prevailing party, 43
except where state law requires H/ROs to include this determination
for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees.44 One example of such a
jurisdiction is California, which requires the hearing officer to make
this explicit determination on an issue-by-issue basis.45
The third limitation is more indirect and generic in terms of
whether an H/RO may use declaratory or other relief to decide an
issue sua sponte. In the only published decision on point,
Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court answered this question in
order of parents' proposed placement and limited the hearing officer's authority to
merely recommend a different placement if he finds the district's proposal
inappropriate. Citing another D.C. decision after Davis that presumably sanctions
injunctive authority, a pair of respected commentators concluded the following:
"The better view appears to be that the hearing officer is not limited to accepting or
rejecting the placement proposed by the [district] and may consider placements
proposed by the parents." Thomas Guernsey & Kathe Klare, SPECIAL EDUCATION
LAw 160 (2001) (citing Diamond v. McKenzie, 602 F. Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1985)).
42. See, e.g., Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR 147, at 787 (Cal.
SEA 2005); Vincennes Cmty. Sch., 22 IDELR 840, 841 (Ind. SEA 1995); Douglas
Pub. Sch., 56 IDELR 28, at 145 (Mass. SEA 2010); Taunton Pub. Sch. 27 IDELR
108, 109 (Mass. SEA 1997); Mountain Lakes Bd. of Educ., 21 IDELR 962, 962
(N.J. SEA 1994); Foxborough Pub. Sch., 21 IDELR 1204, 1206 (Mass. SEA 1994)
(ordering placements that were very similar to parents' proposal); Maine Sch.
Admin. Dist. No. 3, 22 IDELR 1083, 1084 (Me. SEA 1995) (ordering interagency
arrangement for residential placement per parents' position).
43. See Rockport Pub. Sch., 36 IDELR 27, at 100 (Mass. SEA 2002)
(finding it "inappropriate ... to issue an order with respect to ... prevailing party
status"). But see Seattle Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 196, at 760 (Wash. SEA 2001)
(holding that the District denied the student a FAPE and requiring the District to
reimburse the parents for any costs incurred for the student's tuition at a private
school).
44. Another less frequent exception is where a court expressly delegates this
determination to the H/RO. See Burlington Sch. Comm., 20 IDELR 1103, 1106
(Vt. SEA 1994) (holding that prevailing parents are entitled to attorneys' fees). For
the related but separate issue of attorneys' sanctions, which are a form of injunctive
relief, see infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
45. See Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR 201, at 890 (Cal. SEA 2001)
(citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56507(d)).
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the negative. 46 The limited exception, according to that court's
interpretation of the IDEA's administering agency, is that an H/RO
has the authority to decide the child's pendent, or "stay-put,"
placement under the IDEA,47 without either party raising the issue,
which in this context may amount to declaratory relief.48 Yet, on
occasion, H/ROs exercise such authority without clear consideration
of this boundary and its exception. For example, a review officer in
New York decided that a plaintiff-child was not eligible for special
education even though the parties had stipulated at the hearing that
the child was eligible and, thus, it was not an issue on appeal to the
review officer.49
Finally, a state law may disallow particular prospective
placements, which is binding on H/ROs and-according to a recent
ruling-courts.o
II. H/RO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Although there is no bright line distinction between declaratory
and injunctive relief in this context,5' the boundaries of H/ROs'
46. Mifflin County Sch. Dist. v. Special Educ. Due Process Appeals Bd., 800
A.2d 1010 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); cf Saki v. State of Hawaii, 50 IDELR $ 103
(D. Hawaii 2008) (applying the limitation in terms of jurisdiction rather than
remedies). In distinguishing previous Pennsylvania cases, the Mifflin court
provided a rather relaxed boundary to sua sponte considerations. Id. at 1014
(distinguishing Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Jared M., 712 A.2d 807 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998) and Millersburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Lynda T., 707 A.2d 572 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998)). The same court applied this reasoning to injunctive relief.
See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2009); 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (2009).
48. Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303, 304 (OSEP 1997). However, as a
New York review officer decision illustrated, a hearing officer may not issue a
stay-put ruling after issuing their final decision. Bd. of Educ. of Lindenhurst Union
Free Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR 54 (N.Y. SEA 2007).
49. See Lansingburgh Sch. Dist., EHLR 508:122 (N.Y. SEA 1986).
50. Struble v. Fallbrook Union High Sch. 56 IDELR $ 4 (S.D. Cal. 2011).
51. HIROs in some jurisdictions-for example, Pennsylvania-use the term
"order" generically as the caption for the remedies section of their written opinions.
As another example of the blurred boundary, an HIRO's declaratory determination
that the district's or the parent's proposed program or placement is appropriate in
effect amounts to an order to effectuate said program or placement. For more of
these forms of relief, see supra note 12.
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injunctive authority have been the subject of more extensive debate
than the boundaries of H/ROs' declaratory relief. As a threshold
matter, the Pennsylvania courts have applied the same relatively
relaxed sua sponte limitation, which these courts established for
declaratory relief, to H/ROs' injunctive authority.5 2  Other
jurisdictions have applied this same limitation 53 with similar far from
strict latitude. 54 The rest of this Part organizes the applicable rulings
in terms of the subject of the injunctive relief, ranging from
evaluations to attorneys' fees.
Another general limitation on the H/RO's remedial authority,
52. See, e.g., Mars Area Sch. Dist. v. Laurie L., 827 A.2d 1249, 1257-58 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (disallowing a reviewing officer's evaluation of issues that a
hearing officer did not address); Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Frances J., 823
A.2d 249, 252 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (concluding that a hearing officer's failure
to identify a particular issue did not preclude a review officer from addressing,
where the parent had raised, it). The federal courts in the same jurisdiction have
done likewise. See, e.g., Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Karla B., 26 IDELR 827, 830
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding that a review panel lacked authority to consider an
issue not before the hearing officer).
53. See, e.g., Slack v. Del. Dep't of Educ., 826 F. Supp. 115, 123 (D. Del.
1993); Hiller v. Bd. of Educ., 674 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (forbidding
reviewing panels from deciding issues not raised by the parties); Sch. Bd. of Martin
County v. A.S., 727 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (invalidating an
H/RO's sua sponte order for additional speech therapy, citing Hendry County Sch.
Bd. v. Kujawski, 498 So. 2d 566 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986); Bd. of Educ. of City Sch.
Dist. of New York, 31 IDELR 18, at 55 (N.Y. SEA 1998) (vacating a hearing
officer decision to the extent it addressed an issue not raised by the parties); Hyde
Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 658, 662 (N.Y. SEA 1998); Bd. of Educ. of City
Sch. Dist. of New York, 23 IDELR 744, 747 (N.Y. SEA 1995); Fairfax County
Pub. Sch., 21 IDELR 1214, 1218 (Va. SEA 1995); Crandon Sch. Dist., 17 EHLR
718 (Wis. SEA 1991) (finding that a hearing officer lacked authority to consider
issues not pertaining to the hearing).
54. See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 898 (D.D. Cir. 2010)
(holding that hearing officer's order to reduce student's suspension was within his
authority based on FAPE even after determining the student's misconduct was not
a manifestation of his disability); J.S. v. N. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp.
2d 74 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (regarding transition services as implicit within FAPE
issue); Lago Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 50 IDELR 1 104 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
(reversing tuition reimbursement, although also citing alternative grounds); Dep't
of Educ. v. E.B., 45 IDELR 1 249 (D. Hawaii 2006) (ducking sua sponte issue);
Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Peter C., 21 IDELR 354, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that the state review officer did not act beyond his authority by ordering
independent evaluations paid for by the school district). As in various other areas
of remedial boundaries, the treatment overlaps with subject matter jurisdiction.
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typically in the form of injunctive relief, is when the defendant
district has already fully rectified the deficiency." For example, in a
New York case, the review officer overturned the hearing officer's
order to evaluate the student for specific learning disability in math
where the parties had agreed to the math evaluation and the district
had completed it.56 Although based on mootness at the judicial
review level, a federal district court decision in the District of
Columbia adds further support by granting the district's motion for
summary judgment because as a result of the hearing officer's
decision, the district provided all of the relief to which the parent was
entitled.
A. Ordering Evaluations
First, the IDEA expressly provides H/ROs with the authority to
override lack of parental consent for initial evaluations and
reevaluations except where disallowed by state law. There are
many examples of such H/RO orders, which can also be seen as
declaratory relief.59
55. For the obverse, see In re Student with a Disability, 44 IDELR 115
(N.M. SEA 2005) (reversing hearing officer's denial of summary judgment to
district that, in the motion, offered all of the relief that the parents requested).
56. Crown Point Cent. Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR 269 (N.Y. SEA 2007). At the
time of the hearing, the parties were awaiting the results, but there was no evidence
of undue delay. The review officer's mootness reasoning for the related issue of
the effect of the lack of the evaluation on the previous pertinent period, however,
was not cogent as a general matter. A remedy is not necessarily futile and, thus,
moot just because the annual IEP has expired.
57. Green v. Dist. of Columbia, 45 IDELR T 240 (D.D.C. 2006).
58. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR at 354-55; see supra note 12. The
only other pertinent express authorization is for ordering an IEE, but that
authorization applies during the hearing. See supra note 28; see also Conrad
Weiser Area Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 100, 102 (Pa. SEA 1997). For a review officer
decision that interpreted the HIRO's injunctive authority for an IEE during the
hearing not to be subject to a sua sponte limitation, see Bd of Educ. of Hyde Park
Cent. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 658, 662 (N.Y SEA 1998). For a court decision that
held that this H/RO authority does not extend to evaluations in unaccredited and
unapproved placements absent clearer necessity, see Manchester-Essex Reg'1 Sch.
Comm. v. Bureau ofSpecial Educ. Appeals, 490 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Mass. 2007).
59. See, e.g., Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 1069, 1069 (Pa. SEA 1995);
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR 286, at 1240 (Tex. SEA 2002); Cayuga
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A Pennsylvania court decision demarcates two applicable
boundaries to H/ROs' injunctive authority with regard to
evaluations. 60 This decision, though not officially published,
concerns gifted students under state law. Nevertheless, it is available
in Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report (IDELR), and
Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court has treated its gifted
students cases without notable distinction from its IDEA cases.61
First, relying on its aforementioned 62 decision with regard to
declaratory relief under the IDEA, this Pennsylvania court
invalidated the H/RO's order for the district to conduct a reevaluation
because neither party had raised this issue.63  Second, the
Pennsylvania court alternatively reasoned that the review officer
panel erred as a matter of law in ordering a reevaluation because the
court had concluded that the district's reevaluation was appropriate. 64
B. Overriding Refusal of Parental Consent for Services
Prior to the most recent reauthorization of the IDEA, H/ROs'
authority to override a refusal of parental consent and thus effectively
order the provision of special education services to the child was
subject to controversy.65 Congress has made clear, however, that
Indep. Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 815, 816 (Tex. SEA 1995) (permitting school districts
to request an order overriding parental lack of consent).
60. Hempfield Sch. Dist. v. Tyler M., 38 IDELR 68, at 281 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2003).
61. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. For examples of such
interchangeable treatment with regard to the statute of limitations, which is
adjacent to or overlapping with remedial authority, see Carlynton Sch. Dist., 815
A.2d 666 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) and Montour Sch. Dist. v. S. T., 805 A.2d 29 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002). For an example of differentiation with regard to compensatory
education, see Brownsville Area Sch. Dist. v. Student X, 729 A.2d 198 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1999).
62. See Mifflin County Sch. Dist. v. Special Educ. Due Process Appeals Bd.,
800 A.2d 1010 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) and text accompanying note 43.
63. Hempfield Sch. Dist. v. Tyler M., 38 IDELR 68, at 281.
64. Id.
65. Compare Galena Indep. Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR 221, at 896 (Tex. SEA
2004), and Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR T 281, at 1206 (Tex. SEA 2002)
(overriding parental lack of consent), with Letter to Manasevit, 41 IDELR 36, at
201 (OSEP 2003) (asserting that Congress had a clear intent for parents to have the
final say as to whether children enroll in special education), and Letter to Cox, 36
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H/ROs and courts do not have such authority with regard to initial
placement.66
C. Ordering IEP Revisions
It is not unusual for an H/RO to order revisions in a child's IEP.67
When the basis for a revision order was a defensible determination
that the IEP was inappropriate, such relief arguably is within an
H/RO's discretion, unless the relief is deemed to preempt the IEP
team's responsibility. 68  However, a decision by Florida's
intermediate appellate court invalidated an H/RO's order for a district
IDELR 66, at 282-83 (OSEP 2001). In some states, the administering agency
used its funding authority to cause a change in state law to codify its position. See,
e.g., 22 PA. CODE § 14.162(c) (2006).
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)). This limitation appears in the form of a
prohibition against the school district providing services "by utilizing the
procedures described in" the adjudicative dispute resolution provisions of the
IDEA. Id. Conversely, this amendment to the IDEA further indirectly limits the
remedial authority of H/ROs and courts by immunizing the school district against a
resulting claim for denial of FAPE and by excusing the district from its obligation
to convene an IEP meeting and develop an IEP. Id.
67. See, e.g., Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 192, at 735 (Cal.
SEA 2001); Oxnard Union Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR 920, 923 (Cal. SEA 1999);
Hillsborough County Sch. Bd., 21 IDELR 191, 200 (Fla. SEA 1994); Clarion-
Goldfield Cmty. Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 267, 267 (Iowa SEA 1994); Somerville Pub.
Sch., 22 IDELR 764, 765 (Mass. SEA 1995); Brunswick Sch. Dep't, 22 IDELR
1004, 1004 (Me. SEA 1995); Lewiston Sch. Dep't, 21 IDELR 1150,1151 (Me.
SEA 1994); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, 22 IDELR 47, 47 (Minn. SEA 1994); Bd. of
Educ. of Whitesboro Cent. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 895, 895 (N.Y. SEA 1994);
Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 823, 823 (Pa. SEA 1995).
68. See, e.g., Parents of Danielle v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 430 F.
Supp. 2d 3 (D. Mass. 2006); Utica Cmty. Sch., 18 IDELR 980, 980-81 (Mich. SEA
1991); In re Child with Disabilities, 18 IDELR 1135, 1135 (Mo. SEA 1991);
Bensalem Twp. Sch. Dist., 17 EHLR 90 (Pa. SEA 1990); cf Greenville County
Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR 55 (S.C. SEA 2006) (viewing the H/RO's revision as
harmless error). An alternate limitation is when an H/RO orders a future change in
placement not at issue and, thus, in effect sua sponte. See, e.g., Wilkes-Barre Area
Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR 17, at 39 (Pa. SEA 2003); cf Bd. of Educ. of City Sch.
Dist. of New York, 21 IDELR 265, 265 (N.Y. SEA 1994) (dealing with future
IEPs). Nevertheless, Congress expressly recognized and preserved H/ROs'
authority to order compliance with applicable requirements upon finding
procedural violations, thus including but not limited to procedural deficiencies in
IEPs. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)).
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to add specified services to the IEP that were at issue when there was
no such determination. 69 Reasoning that the H/RO had concluded
that the IEP was appropriate, the court ruled that the order to add
services to the IEP was beyond the H/RO's authority. 70 Similarly, a
federal district court overruled an H/RO's order to revise the
student's behavior intervention plan after concluding that the IEP,
including the BIP, met the applicable standards for FAPE, although
the court's reversal and reasoning were not particularly clear and
broad-based.7 ' Another federal court avoided this problem by
interpreting the hearing officer's order, in the wake of a decision that
the IEP provided FAPE in the LRE, as merely confirming the IEP
team's authority to proceed to make its proposed modifications,
subject to the parent's right to challenge them.72 An added problem
with orders to revise the IEP in cases where the H/RO deems the
placement or program appropriate is that such orders may well
trigger the issue of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision.73 Yet, H/ROs
sometimes order such revisions, presumably ignorant of such
limitations. 74
69. Sch. Bd. of Martin County v. A.S., 727 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
70. Citing a previous Davis-based decision, the court referred to sua sponte
grounds, but its rationale can also be seen as functus officio, that is, that, by
resolving the issue of appropriateness, the H/RO lacked authority to order any
relief. Id. at 1074-75.
71. Lake Travis Indep. Sch. Dist. v. M.L., 50 IDELRN 105 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
72. L. v. N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Conn. 2009); cf
Dist. of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 898 (D.D. Cir. 2010) (holding that hearing
officer's order to reduce student's suspension was within his authority even after
determining the student's misconduct was not a manifestation of his disability
because he found that the longer suspension would be a denial of FAPE).
73. See, e.g., Linda T. ex rel. William A. v. Rice Lake Area Sch. Dist., 417
F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2005) (ruling that parent was not the prevailing party for purpose
of attorneys' fees where the ordered revisions were de minimis in comparison to the
primary issue of placement, which the district won).
74. For examples of instances in which H/ROs ignored limitations on their
authority to add services to the IEP, see In re Student with a Disability, 48 IDELR
1 146 (N.M. SEA 2007); Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 22 IDELR 931 (Ala. SEA
1995); Ipswich Pub. Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR T 113, at 556 (Mass. SEA 2005); W.
Springfield Pub. Sch., 42 IDELR $ 22, at 95 (Mass. SEA 2004); Portland Sch.
Dep't, 21 IDELR 1209 (Me. SEA 1995); Worcester Pub. Sch., 43 IDELR $ 213, at
986 (Mass. SEA 2005); Bd of Educ. of Portage Pub. Sch., 25 IDELR 372 (Mich.
Spring 2011
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D. Ordering a Particular Student Placement
Reflecting the overlap between declaratory and injunctive relief,
the foregoing discussion about the boundaries for H/ROs' authority
to declare in favor of a particular placement also applies to their
authority to order such a placement."
E. Awarding Tuition Reimbursement
Whether viewed as tied to program or placement, the two forms
of relief most specifically associated with the IDEA are tuition
reimbursement and compensatory education services.
Tuition reimbursement, used generically to refer to
reimbursement for various expenses in addition to or alternative to
tuition, such as transportation and other related services, is a well-
established remedy under the IDEA. In a pair of decisions, 76 the
Supreme Court established what most authorities view as a three-part
test: (1) whether the district's proposed placement is appropriate; (2)
if not, whether the parents' unilateral placement is appropriate; and
(3) if so, equitable considerations.77  In establishing this set of
SEA 1996); Bd of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the New York, 21 IDELR 472
(N.Y. SEA 1994); Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 825 (Pa. SEA 1995);
Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 1193 (Pa. SEA 1994); Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist.,
21 IDELR 878 (Pa. SEA 1994); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 208 (Tex.
SEA 1994); Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 482 (Tex. SEA 1994); Granite
Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 405 (Utah SEA 1995); Loudon County Pub. Sch., 22 IDELR
833 (Va. SEA 1995); cf Taunton Pub. Sch., 54 IDELR T 36 (Mass. SEA 2010)
(ordered non-party re-evaluation after determining that the child's program and
placement were appropriate). For an unusual example of the obverse, an Illinois
hearing officer included in her orders, upon upholding the appropriateness of the
district's proposed placement that, "if the guardian chooses to 'home school' this
child, it shall be considered as a truancy and reported to appropriate authorities as
such." Bd. of Educ. of Harlem Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 122, 44 IDELR 18, at 75
(Ill. SEA 2005). The exception is for the limited circumstance of hearing officer
Honig-type injunctions. See supra note 12.
75. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
76. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Burlington
Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
77. E.g., Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 14, at 351. Although not foreclosing the
possibility of tuition reimbursement without a denial of FAPE, the Third Circuit
recently rejected such a residuum for an extended delay in the adjudicatory
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criteria, the Court made clear that it based this tuition reimbursement
remedy on the IDEA authorization for appropriate judicial relief 8
and that said relief was distinguishable from money damages.7 9 In its
subsequent codification of this case law via the 1997 reauthorization
of the IDEA,80 Congress made clear that the authority to award
tuition reimbursement extends to H/ROs.81
Before and after the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, H/ROs have
routinely applied the relevant three-part test without any other
particular boundary. 82 In the only notable-but temporary-judicial
limitation, the Third Circuit-in a case that arose before the 1997
amendments-negated an H/RO's equitable reduction of the
reimbursement amount.83  The court declared that unreasonable
parental conduct was not a relevant factor, but the court
acknowledged that Congress had included it in the applicable
approval of the appropriateness of an IEP. C.W. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist.,
395 F. App'x 824 (3d Cir 2010).
78. Burlington Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 369. Although the Court focused on
judicial remedial authority, other sources interpreted the authority as extending to
H/ROs. See, e.g., Letter to Van Buiten, EHLR 211:429A (OSEP 1987) (citing S-1
v. Spangler, 650 F. Supp. 1427 (M.D.N.C. 1986)).
79. Burlington Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 370-71 ("Reimbursement merely
requires the Town to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and
would have bome in the first instance .. ).
80. This codification arguably preserves the uncodified residuum of
Burlington-Carter. See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 12,603 (Mar. 12, 1999). The Supreme
Court provided support for this view in Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. TA., 129 S. Ct.
2484, 2494 n. 11 (2009) (relying on Burlington-Carter to reject defendant district's
argument regarding purported conflict between remedial authority provisions of
IDEA). In any event, this decision filled a gap not clearly addressed by either the
legislation nor Burlington and Carter, ruling that lack of previous enrollment in the
district's special education program is one of several equitable factors for, rather
than automatic preclusion of, tuition reimbursement.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(ii) (2009); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2009).
However, in an apparent glitch, Congress limited one of its equitable
considerations to a "judicial" finding of parental unreasonableness. 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 148(c). A recent decision interpreted this language
as nonrestrictive in light of the overall Congressional delegation of tuition
reimbursement determinations to IH/ROs and courts. Hogan v. Fairfax County
Sch. Bd., 645 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2009).
82. See, e.g., Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 14.
83. Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 86 & n.3 (3d
Cir. 1999).
19
20 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
calculus for cases arising after 1997.84 In a recent case, a federal
district court illustrated that H/ROs authority under the current IDEA
to reduce tuition reimbursement is based on equitable balancing.
Even more recently, another federal district court held that-upon
finding the rest of the three-part test met-ordering direct retroactive
payment to the private school, where the parents had not paid the
tuition based on their lack of financial resources, was within the
IHO's equitable authority under the IDEA even though it is not
literally "reimbursement." 86
Another published decision that demarcated a specifically
pertinent limitation on tuition reimbursement as a remedy was a
review officer decision under the IDEA jurisdiction of the
Department of Defense Domestic Dependent Elementary and
Secondary Schools (DDESS). More specifically, the review officer
ruled that (1) hearing officers' remedial orders are entitled to the
general rebuttable presumption of good faith deference,8 7 and (2) the
reimbursable expenses must be reasonable and do not include the
"normal expenses of raising a child."88 The case was the subject of
multiple judicial appeals, but these appeals focused on other issues. 89
84. Id.
85. Hogan v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 645 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2009).
86. Mr. A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2011 WL 321137 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 1, 2011).
87. In contrast to this first part of this review officer's decision, the Ninth
Circuit recently ruled that the standard of judicial review of an IHO's tuition
reimbursement decision is de novo. Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H.,
587 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2009). For a recent decision where the court upheld the
IHO's tuition reimbursement rulings under what appeared to be de novo review,
see Ka.D. v. Solana Beach School District, 254 IDELR 310 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
88. In re Student with a Disability, 30 IDELR 408, 416-18 (DDESS 1998).
The review officer also reversed the hearing officer's decision with regard to other
injunctive relief, which is separately addressed infra notes 142-43 and
accompanying text. In contrast, a state appellate court's limitation on the
reimbursement remedy in the IDEA's complaint resolution process would not
appear to apply to the multi-step standards for H/ROs. Specially, a Minnesota
appeals court reversed the state's corrective action of partial tuition (here tutoring)
reimbursement because it had only an equivocal, not direct, nexus to the IDEA
deficiency, or FAPE violation. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 192 v. Minnesota Dep't of
Educ., 742 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
89. G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 324 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2003), 343 F.3d
295 (4th Cir. 2003).
31-1
Spring 2011 The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers
Representing even more limiting authority, a hearing officer in
Kansas ruled that tuition reimbursement was not available for a gifted
student based on a district's failure to implement the student's IEP.90
The hearing officer's reasoning and invocation of cited authorities
were not clear or cogent,91 but the decision is not necessarily limited
to gifted students because Kansas's special education law is the
same, in relevant part, for students with disabilities. 92
Finally, in a recent unpublished decision, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that tuition reimbursement is not available as a
remedy for a district's delay for more than one year in processing a
parent's request for an IDEA impartial hearing where the ultimate
determination was that the district had provided the child with
FAPE.93 The reasoning was that the purpose of this form of relief is
to remediate denials of FAPE not to punish districts.94
F. Awarding Compensatory Education
Compensatory education, like tuition reimbursement, is a
specialized form of injunctive remedy. The courts have established
compensatory education as an available equitable remedy under the
IDEA via an analogy, albeit an incomplete one, 95 to tuition
90. Unified Sch. Dist. 259 Wichita Pub. Sch., 39 IDELR 82, at 1504 (Kan.
SEA 2003).
91. For example, the hearing officer refers to various forms of hostility, but a
failure to provide FAPE, whether as a matter of formulation or implementation,
certainly suffices for the primary step of the Burlington-Carter analysis. Similarly,
the hearing officer makes the analogy to punitive damages, but the cited authority,
which are IDEA cases, merely distinguish tuition reimbursement from money
damages.
92. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Gified Education: An Overview
of the Legislation and Regulations, 27 ROEPER REv. 228, 229 (2005) ("Kansas ...
has laws [for gifted students] that approach the strength and specificity of the
primary federal legislation for students with disabilities.").
93. C.W v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 395 F. App'x 824 (3d Cir. 2010).
94. The court's ruling and reasoning for the parent's alternative claim for
compensatory education was the same. Id.
95. One distinction is that tuition reimbursement requires the parents to prove
the appropriateness of their chosen program. Another is that tuition
reimbursement, except for the equitable limitations, is essentially an all-or-nothing
choice, whereas compensatory education is amenable to careful tailoring. Thus far,
neither the courts nor HIROs have recognized these distinctions in their analyses.
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reimbursement. 96 Although the Third Circuit initially commented, by
way of dicta, that H/ROs do not have the authority to award
compensatory education, 97 the IDEA administering agency98 and the
courts99 have established that H/ROs do have such authority under
the IDEA.'00 Previous sources have comprehensively canvassed the
standards for, and other issues specific to, the award of compensatory
education.' 0 The foundational element, as the Third Circuit, recently
To the contrary, the Third Circuit's differential treatment, to whatever extent that it
remains differential, lacks an explicit rationale. See supra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text. M.C. v. Cent. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir.
1996). For a suggested approach that is defensibly consistent, see Zirkel 2006,
supra note 15. Quaere whether Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516
(2007), in which the Supreme Court concluded that parents have independent
enforceable rights under the IDEA, supports or counters the purported distinction
between tuition reimbursement as the parent's right and compensatory education as
the student's right?
96. See, e.g., Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990);
Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 1986) (concluding that Congress
gave courts the power to grant a compensatory remedy).
97. Lester H., 916 F.2d at 869.
98. See, e.g., Letter to Anonymous, 21 IDELR 1061 (OSEP 1994) (advising
that a SEA and a hearing officer may require compensatory education); Letter to
Kohn, 17 EHLR 522 (OSEP 1991).
99. See, e.g.. Diatta v. District of Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C.
2004); Harris v. District of Columbia, 19 IDELR 105, 107-08 (D.D.C. 1992);
Cocores v. Portsmouth Sch. Dist., 779 F. Supp. 203 (D.N.H. 1991); Big Beaver
Area Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 615 A.2d 910 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (finding that the
hearing officer had authority to grant compensatory education); cf Bd. of Educ. v.
Munoz, 772 N.Y.S.2d 275 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that New York state law
requires that the state department of education's decision regarding an H/RO's
order of temporary relief be final).
100. For a curious decision in which the court avoided the issue but evidenced
obvious confusion as to the difference between compensatory education and a
prospective placement order, see Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F.
Supp. 860 (D.N.H. 1992).
101. Zirkel, supra notes 15 and 27; Perry A. Zirkel & M. Kay Hennessey,
Compensatory Educational Services in Special Education Cases: An Update, 150
EDUC. L. REP. 311 (2001); Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Educational Services in
Special Education Cases, 67 EDUC. L. REP. 881 (1991); see also James
Schwellenbach, Mixed Messages: An Analysis of the Conflicting Standards Used
by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals when Awarding Compensatory
Education for a Violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 53
ME. L. REv. 245 (2001).
reinforced,'02 is the denial of FAPE.103
Given the focus here on the scope of H/RO remedial authority, it
suffices to identify the following sample of possible, but unsettled,
boundaries104 for the courts and, by inference, H/ROs with regard to
compensatory education awards: (1) after graduation, 0 (2) during
stay-put after age 21,106 (3) for denying opportunity for meaningful
parental participation, 07  (4) concurrent with tuition
reimbursement, 0 8 and (5) for postsecondary education.109 More
102. C.W. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 395 F. App'x 824 (3d Cir. 2010)
(concluding that "[t]he purpose of compensatory education is not to punish school
districts for failing to follow the established procedures for providing a free
appropriate public education, but to compensate students with disabilities who have
not received an appropriate education").
103. Zirkel 2010, supra note 15, at 503-04 nn.23-26 and accompanying text.
The minority view is that the denial must be gross. Id. at 504 n.25.
104. Each of these issues is subject to split and relatively limited authority.
105. Zirkel 2010, supra note 15, at 503 n.18; Zirkel, supra note 27, at 746
n.30.
106. Zirkel, supra note 27, at 748 n.17. In contrast, the availability of
compensatory education after age 21 for violations before age 21 is relatively
settled. Id. at 748 n.16; Zirkel 2010, supra note 15, at 502 n.15. For a recent
example, see Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 612 F.3d 712 (3d Cir. 2010)
(upholding compensatory education, in the unusual form of an IEP, after age 21 for
denial of FAPE before age 21).
107. See, e.g., D.B. v. Gloucester Twp. Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 764
(D.N.J. 2010).
108. Zirkel 2010, supra note 15, at 508 nn.53-54; Zirkel, supra note 27, at 755
nn.67-68. A variation of this issue is when the two forms of relief are not awarded
for the same period, instead being successive or alternative. For example, the Third
Circuit recently ruled that compensatory education is not available for a unilaterally
placed child, i.e., as an alternative to tuition reimbursement where the parent
proves a denial of FAPE but loses at one of the subsequent steps. P.P. v. W.
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727 (3d Cir. 2009). In a case earlier in the year,
the same court had rejected compensatory education where the district had made
good faith efforts to provide FAPE, leaving ambiguous whether such alternative
relief would be available. Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 575 F.3d 235
(2009). In a more recent and unpublished decision, the same court rejected
compensatory education, as an alternative to tuition reimbursement, where the
district flagrantly delayed in processing the request for an impartial hearing but the
ultimate determination was that the district's IEP was appropriate. C.W. v. Rose
Tree Media Sch. Dist., 395 F. App'x 824 (3d Cir 2010). On the other hand,
contributing to the confusion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a decision that include
the H/RO's unchallenged choice of remedy, which was prospective tuition
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settled is the limitation that the award may not be either open-ended
or in excess of "what is required for compliance with the student's
IEP.""10 Similarly settled, and as would apply to any injunctive
relief, an H/RO's compensatory education order must not be either
sua sponte," or so vague as to be unenforceable.112 Finally, H/ROs
have differed widely, but courts have not yet addressed various other
scope issues, such as whether an H/RO may retain jurisdiction for
implementation"13 and, if not, to whom an H/RO should instead
delegate the implementation of the award.114 Nevertheless, as a
reimbursement as a form of compensatory education. Draper v. Atlanta Sch. Sys.,
518 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008).
109. Zirkel 2010, supra note 15, at 508 n.52; Zirkel, supra note 27, at 754
n.66.
110. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Frances J., 823 A.2d 249, 257 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003).
111. See, e.g., Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Karla B., 26 IDELR 827 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (granting a motion for summary judgment because the issue of compensatory
education was withdrawn from the hearing officer's consideration). Yet, H/ROs
continue to transgress this limit, even on occasion in Pennsylvania. See Lampeter
Strasburg School District, 43 IDELR 17, at 51 (Pa. SEA 2005); In re Student
with a Disability, 42 IDELR 224, at 1195 (Pa. SEA 2005) (providing the most
recent examples).
112. See Zirkel, supra note 27, at 756 n.78 (noting that vague awards cause
implementation problems); cf Streck v. Bd. of Educ., 280 F. App'x 66 (2d Cir.
2008) (finding lack of evidentiary basis).
113. Zirkel 2010, supra note 15, at 508 n.58; Zirkel, supra note 27, at 755
n.72.
114. Zirkel 2010, supra note 15, at 508 n.60; Zirkel, supra note 27, at 755
nn.73-75. A recent federal appeals court decision ruled that an H/RO may not
delegate remedial authority for formulating the amount of compensatory education
to the IEP team, which includes at least one district employee, in light of the IDEA
prohibition that the H/RO may not be a district employee. Reid v. District of
Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Bd. of Educ. of Fayette
County v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1042 (2007).
The prevailing judicial view, however, even in the D.C. Circuit, is that the IEP
team is the appropriate forum for resolving the implementation issues of the
compensatory education award. See, e.g., Simms v. District of Columbia, 404 F.
Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2005); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 374 F. Supp. 2d
168 (D.D.C. 2005); Melvin v. Town of Bolton Sch. Dist., 20 IDELR 1189 (D. Vt.
1993), affd mem., 100 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1996); State of Conn. Unified Dist. No. I
v. State Dep't of Educ., 699 A.2d 1077 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997); cf Struble v.
Fallbrook Union High Sch., 56 IDELR 4 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (upholding remand to
IEP team to devise, not reduce or discontinue, the award). A related question is
whether the HIRO must or may order such implementation via an escrow fund.
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general matter courts have agreed that H/ROs have rather wide
equitable discretion in their calculus for compensatory education." 5
G. Changing Student Grades or Records
H/ROs occasionally face an issue of student records, and their
decisions are usually knee-jerk disclaimers without careful research
or reasoning.1 6 In one of the few pertinent published decisions, a
Zirkel 2010, supra note 15, at 509 n.62; Zirkel, supra note 27, at 756 n.77. For
recent examples, see Streck v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 105 (N.D.N.Y. 2009),
modified, 408 F. App'x 411 (2d Cir. 2010) (ordering escrow account for $37,778
for prescribed compensatory reading services for student now at postsecondary
institution); Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. D.Y., 54 IDELR 52 (D.
Alaska 2010) (upholding, after supplemental briefing under qualitative approach,
$50k compensatory education fund equivalent to approximately 300 hours of
speech therapist services plus roughly 208 hours of aide services, at the respective
rates of $125 and $60 per hour, or 2.7 hours of speech services and 1.9 hours of
aide services per week for 3 school years); cf Millay v. Surry Sch. Dep't, 56
IDELR 1 162 (D. Me. 2011) (rejecting trust fund under the circumstances).
115. See, e.g., Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that compensatory education is an equitable remedy and only to
be awarded when appropriate). However, there is some authority that the basis for
calculation must be the student's changed needs rather than the student's needs at
the time of the denial. See, e.g., Conn. Unified Sch. Dist. v. State Dep't of Educ.,
699 A.2d 1077, 1090 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997) (deciding that the compensatory
education program, while unorthodox, is appropriate). Moreover, a federal appeals
court recently overturned an H/RO's "cookie cutter" approach, requiring instead a
customized calculation qualitatively based on "specific educational deficits
resulting from [the child's] loss of FAPE." Reid, 401 F.3d at 523, 526; see also
Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasizing the
need for an inquiry that is "qualitative, fact-intensive, and above all, tailored to the
unique needs of the disabled student"); cf D.H. v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 45
IDELR 38 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (based on "only those needs of the student[] that
directly flow from his diagnosed SLD"). In a recent district court decision in the
wake of Reid and Branham, the judge expressed a general preference for H/ROs to
make this needs-based determination, subject to judicial review. Thomas v. District
of Columbia, 407 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2005). For a more complete canvassing
of the case law concerning the qualitative approach, which present procedural and
evidentiary complications for HIROs, see Zirkel, Competing Approaches, supra
note 15. For the possible need under the qualitative approach for a bifurcated
approach at the IHO level based on the analogy to additional evidence upon
judicial review, see Gill v. Dist. of Columbia, 751 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2010);
Banks v. Dist. of Columbia, 720 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2010).
116. See, e.g., Bourne Pub. Sch., 37 IDELR 1261, at 1144 (Mass. SEA 2002)
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Virginia review officer concluded that H/ROs do not have
jurisdiction and thus do not have remedial authority to change the
grades of an IDEA student." 7 The review officer reasoned that the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) provides a
procedure and forum for addressing such matters,118 a rather
unconvincing rationale. 119
H/ROs' injunctive authority with regard to student records has
similarly been subject to very few published decisions. For example,
a hearing panel in Missouri cursorily concluded that it lacked
authority to expunge student records.12 0 In doing so, the panel relied
solely on the fact that it was a panel of limited jurisdiction. 12 1
Releasing records is a different remedy from expunging them. In
a New Mexico decision, the review officer concluded that H/ROs
lack authority under the IDEA to override parents' refusal to release
the child's medical records.122 Citing two published H/RO decisions
from other states, the review officer relied on the reasoning that such
matters were exclusively within the jurisdiction of FERPA, which is
not necessarily persuasive.' 23 In any event, the review officer also
(denying jurisdiction with the only explanation being, without any cited support,
that "[t]his is not a claim for which there is available relief under the IDEA").
117. Fairfax County Pub. Sch., 38 IDELR 275, at 1097 (Va. SEA 2003).
118. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2009).
119. The express provisions in the IDEA for student records and the broad-
based scope of the IDEA's adjudicative dispute resolution mechanism arguably
suggest overlapping, rather than mutually exclusive, jurisdiction between the IDEA
and the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), at least when the
records issue relates to the identification, evaluation, or placement of the child.
See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.613-.621 (2009) (providing an SEA with broad
authority to ensure the requirements of the IDEA are met); § 507(a) (allowing for
parental due process rights). When the H/RO has jurisdiction, remedial authority
within the otherwise prescribed boundaries should follow.
120. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR 221, at 923 (Mo. SEA 2004). The panel
contributed to the questionableness of its conclusion by responding to the parents'
request for tuition reimbursement merely as follows: "[We] may not place the
student in a parochial school or award money damages ... ." Id at 923.
121. Id.
122. In re Student with a Disability, 40 IDELR 119, at 485 (N.M. SEA
2003).
123. Id. In addition to the arguable concurrent jurisdiction of the FERPA
office and HIROs (see supra note 119), it is not at all clear how FERPA covers a
student's medical record where the parents have not released it to the school.
31-1
agreed with dicta in the cited decisions and characterized those
decisions as "consistently deplor[ing] the refusal of such releases and
express[ing] concern over the results of failures to share relevant
information with school personnel." 24
H. Ordering a Student's Promotion or Graduation
Not addressing the remedial authority of H/ROs with regard to
promotion and graduation, the IDEA's administering agency offered
the adjacent interpretation that, while standards for promotion and
retention are a state and local function, "the IDEA does not prevent a
State or local education agency from assigning this decisionmaking
responsibility to the IEP team."1 25 But in the absence of such state
law delegation, increasing authority seems to suggest that H/ROs
face limits in ordering such relief.12 6 For example, a Massachusetts
hearing officer avoided deciding whether H/ROs lack authority to
order promotions, concluding that waiving the district's summer
credit policy was not appropriate for the particular student.'27 More
strongly, Pennsylvania's intermediate court concluded that the state
law's delegation of graduation authority to school districts preempted
an H/RO from accelerating the graduation of a gifted student.128
124. In re Student with a Disability, 40 IDELR 119, at 490.
125. Letter to Davis-Wellington, 40 IDELR T 182, at 748 (OSEP 2003). For
the related question concerning the failure to provide IEP-specified
accommodations for graduation and other district- or state-wide testing, OSEP
suggested that the controlling criterion is whether the failure has resulted in a
denial of FAPE and that the proper remedy (although not ascribed specifically to an
H/RO) is to provide the student with the opportunity to retake the assessment with
appropriate accommodations. Id.
126. In contrast, some H/RO decisions have prudentially avoided such
determinations, thus avoiding the necessity and opportunity for judicial guidance.
See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 1130 (N.Y. SEA 1998) (finding
that the transition assistance afforded a disabled student was sufficient and
graduating the student was proper); cf Conejo Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 29
IDELR 779 (Cal. SEA 1998) (postponing a determination by treating the issue as
remedial rather than jurisdictional and, thus, warranting factual development).
127. Boston Pub. Sch., 24 IDELR 985, 988 (Mass. SEA 1996). The hearing
officer thus found it unnecessary to determine whether she had "the authority to
order credits which would in effect promote" the student. Id. at 989 n.4.
128. Saucon Valley Sch. Dist. v. Robert 0., 785 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2001).
27Spring 2011 The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers
28 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
Although the factual circumstances correlate more closely to gifted
students than to those with disabilities, 12 9 the court did not
specifically limit its decision to gifted students.130
Similarly, an H/RO has limited authority to order a school district
to allow a child with disabilities to participate in graduation where
either the child has not completed graduation requirements'31 or the
denial did not violate applicable special education regulations or the
child's IEP.132
I. Ordering Training ofDistrict Personnel
On occasion H/ROs order training of specified school district
personnel without examining whether H/ROs have authority to
provide such relief.133 In one of many examples,134 a Connecticut
129. For example, the court observed that the student needed acceleration,
while reasoning that it was "counter-intuitive to consider that [the student's]
progress was accelerated by completing fewer credits, albeit faster, than his
matriculation peers." Id. at 1079.
130. Specifically, the court relied on its IDEA-related Woodland Hills
decision; see infra note 131 for its preemption rationale. Id. at 1078. Nevertheless,
the court limited the scope of its ruling by expressly not considering the question of
whether the state's review officer panel has "authority to grant credit for pre-high
school courses, which could then satisfy the requirements of graduation." Id. at
1079 n.20.
131. Woodland Hills Sch. Dist. v. S.F., 747 A.2d 433, 434 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000).
132. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR 146, at 493-94 (Cal. SEA 2000).
133. See, e.g., Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 43 IDELR 234, at 1095
(Ala. SEA 2005) (ordering training for teachers and administrators on developing
IEPs based on individual student needs when the student moves to homebound
school from regular school); Portland Pub. Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR 143, at 745 (Or.
SEA 2005) (requiring training for staff involved in implementing an IEP); In re
Student with a Disability, 42 IDELR 224 (Pa. SEA 2005) (upholding without
objection order to train school's special education personnel in specified behavior-
related areas); cf Sanford Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. L, 34 IDELR T 262, at 972-
73 (D. Me. 2001) (identifying that the H/RO ordered training of an additional
therapist, but the issue on appeal was the compensatory education part of the
order). For an example of an H/RO decision enforcing the limitation on ordering
training, see Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR 79, at 374 (Pa. SEA 2004),
which found an order of training to be an error of law.
134. See San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR 249, at 1370 (Cal. SEA
2005) (requiring training of specific staff members regarding certain medical
31-1
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hearing officer ordered that a student's IEP be revised to require that
all of the student's teachers receive training as to the student's
disability, behavior intervention plan, and required services and
accommodations.'15 The hearing officer also ordered the training and
selection of an aide for the student.136
The limited pertinent court decisions subject such orders to
question. Specifically, Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court
has ruled that H/ROs lack the authority to order a district to arrange
for training of its employees as a remedy for denial of FAPE because
state law delegates staff development to districts.137 Although the
case arose in the context of state regulations for gifted students,
which differ in part from the IDEA,138 the court in subsequent
remedy related decisions imported this ruling to the IDEA context. 139
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania court's preemption rationale is
subject to dispute in cases controlled by the federal IDEA, as
compared to state special education laws that are not deemed to be
incorporated into federal standards. Thus far, the additional authority
is itself inconclusive,14 0 although that concerning the analogous or
overlapping next form of relief provides further guidance.
conditions and requirements of special education law); Chicago Pub. Sch., 22
IDELR 1008, 1011 (Ill. SEA 1995) (ordering training regarding students with
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and on developing and implementing
IEPs).
135. Greenwich Bd. of Educ., 40 IDELR 1 223, at 929 (Ct. SEA 2003).
136. Id.
137. Saucon Valley Sch. Dist. v. Robert 0., 785 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2001).
138. See, e.g., id. at 1075 n.10 (noting the distinction federal law draws
between gifted and special education).
139. See infra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the propriety of an
H/RO ordering the hiring of an outside expert).
140. Chattahoochee County Bd. of Educ., EHLR 508:215 (Ga. SEA 1987)
(ruling that hearing officer lacks authority to order specific training of personnel);
cf Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 613 (7th Cir.
2004) (dicta criticizing IHO for imposing training and other relief that went beyond
remedying the individual child's situation). But cf Park v. Anaheim Union High
Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding compensatory education in
the form of staff training); Peter G. v. Chicago Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 299, 38 IDELR
94 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (upholding implementation of hearing officer's training order
without directly determining whether it was ultra vires, especially in the wake of
the hearing officer's rejection of parent's FAPE challenge).
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J. Ordering Districts to Hire Consultants
On occasion, H/ROs order districts to hire an outside expert as
part of the remedy for denial of FAPE.141 Yet, H/ROs have not
reflected general cognizance of the increasing case law that points to
boundaries in issuing such consultant remedies.
In the first case to impose a boundary, a DDESS review officer
reversed such an order as "impermissible micro management," and
thus "ultra vires and a clear abuse of discretion."l 42 Although
grounded in the statutory prerogatives of the education agency, the
ruling is limited for several reasons: (1) DDESS represents a special
context; (2) the hearing officer's order included various other forms
of nonreimbursement relief, which the review officer's opinion
covered only cryptically; and (3) the subsequent judicial appeals
focused on other issues.143
Second, in dicta in a case concerning the appropriateness of an
IEP, the Seventh Circuit commented on a hearing officer's "extensive
relief, including, among other things, the appointment of private
141. See, e.g., Decatur County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 45 IDELR T 294 (Ind. SEA)
(ordering the district to retain a consultant with specified skills to develop an FBA
and BIP for the student); Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR 26 (Iowa SEA
2007) (ordering the district to obtain assistance from an outside consultant with
specified expertise); In re Student with a Disability, 48 IDELR 146 (N.M. SEA
2007) (ordering state-approved IEP facilitator of parent's choice for next IEP
meeting for "profound" but nonprejudicial procedural violation); Worcester Pub.
Sch., 43 IDELR T 213, at 987-89 (Mass. SEA 2005) (finding that the case
warranted an outside consultant to determine the expertise required for the
student's therapist); Bd. of Educ. of Portage Pub. Sch., 25 IDELR 372, 375, 377
(Mich. SEA 1996) (assigning two consultants); Evolution Acad. Charter Sch., 42
IDELR T 219, at 1151 (Tex. SEA 2004) (ordering the school to hire an independent
expert trained in developing IEPs); Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 493, 496 (Pa.
SEA 1998) (requiring a behavior specialist); cf W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 42
IDELR T 22, at 98 (Mass. SEA 2004) (assigning an on-site case manager).
Contrast these cases with the situation in which a district failed to provide
sufficient consultant services under the child's IEP. See, e.g., Troy Sch. Dist. v.
Boutsikaris, 250 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (upholding the review officer's
remedy of compensatory education).
142. In re Student with a Disability, 30 IDELR 408, 418 (DDESS 1998).
143. See, e.g., G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 324 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2003)
(contrasting a federal FAPE standard with North Carolina's standard), amended by
343 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2003).
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consultants who would essentially manage and deliver [the student's]
public education."'" Regarding this relief as supporting the lower
court's conclusion that the hearing officer did not provide due
deference to the school personnel's IEP judgments, the Seventh
Circuit characterized the hearing officer's remedies as "extreme
measures that obviously went beyond remedying [the student's]
situation." 4 5  The degree to which this proportionality limitation
applied to the ordered consultants is unclear because the court cited
another of the hearing officer's remedies as illustrative of the hearing
officer's overreaching-the order that the district provide disability
awareness and sensitivity training for every student in the district.146
A federal district court's subsequent reversal of a hearing officer's
order for neutral facilitator for all future meetings was similarly
inconclusive due to the open-endedness of the hearing officer's order
and the express limitation to the "particular facts" of case.147
In the third and most significant development to date,
Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court concluded that an
H/RO's order that a district hire an outside expert to facilitate the
development of a new IEP for the plaintiff-student was ultra vires in
light of (1) the regulatory delegation of IEP team membership to the
school district, (2) the limited scope of the violation, and (3) the
regulatory limitations on IEP team composition.148 The same court
144. Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 610
(7th Cir. 2004). In an earlier bench decision for another case in the same
jurisdiction, the district court arguably approved the IHO's consultant order by
concluding that "the only point that I think the IHO might have gone too far in
specifically ordering [the consultant] without regard to her hourly rate." Bd. of
Educ. of New Trier Twp. High Sch. Dist. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 28 IDELR 1175
(N.D. Ill. 1998).
145. Id. at 614.
146. Id.
147. Pachl v. Seagren, 373 F. Supp. 2d 969, 978 (D. Minn. 2005).
148. Saucon Valley Sch. Dist. v. Robert 0., 785 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2001). The court was not clear or convincing with regard to the scope of its
rationale. For example, after pointing out that the violation was the district's
ejection of the parents from the IEP team, the court reasoned: "Although the
[HI/RO] may have the implicit authority to remedy non-compliance with the special
education regulations, it does not have the authority to impose requirements in
addition to those in the regulations." Id. at 1078. The conclusion about additional
requirements does not seem to square with the court's recognition that the
regulations set minimum, not maximum, requirements for IEP team membership.
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has interchangeably applied this limitation in the gifted student and
IDEA contexts, but it left the limitation's specific scope unclear in
the IDEA context, explicitly ruling only that an H/RO lacked
authority to order the district to engage outside experts for students
with disabilities "without supporting evidence in the record." 49
Finally, the same Pennsylvania court also applied its sua sponte
limitation to invalidate an H/RO order to hire an outside expert. 5 0
The more recent decisions have largely ignored or at least
partially countered such limitations. For example, a federal district
court in Kentucky initially upheld a review officer's order to arrange
for the student's private psychologist to attend the IEP meeting, at
district expense, to help the team devise and monitor a plan for
providing the student with two years of compensatory education.' 5'
The court concluded that the requirement of the psychologist's
attendance was equitable in this particular case, inasmuch as the
review officer delegated the tailoring of the compensatory education
to the team rather than ordering a specific number of hours. The
court did not mention the Pennsylvania decisions, probably because
the school district's argument did not extend beyond the
requirements of the IDEA to the possible limitations of state law.
After the Sixth Circuit reversed on other grounds,152 the district court
delegated to the equitable discretion of the review officer to
determine whether to require paid attendance of the student's private
psychologist or an independent literacy expert as part of its
compensatory education award.'5 3
Similarly, the both the Second Circuit and a federal district court
recently upheld H/RO orders for inclusion consultants under the
Id.
149. Mifflin County Sch. Dist. v. Special Educ. Due Process Appeals Bd., 800
A.2d 1010, 1015 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); see Wilkes-Barre Area Sch. Dist., 32
IDELR 17, at 40-41 (Pa. SEA 1999) (demonstrating subsequent application of
this limitation).
150. Mars Area Sch. Dist. v. Laurie L., 827 A.2d 1249, 1257-58 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2003).
151. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County v. L.M., 45 IDELR 95 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
152. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1042 (2007).
153. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County v. L.M., 49 IDELR 197 (E.D. Ky. 2008).
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rubric of compensatory education.15" Arguably, the focus on
compensatory education in the context of the LRE is particularly
amenable to a consultant remedy as compared to a pure FAPE case,
but these courts did not limit the H/ROs equitable authority to such
situations.
Most recently, while supporting the H/RO's equitable authority to
order the district to hire an independent consultant with appropriate
credentials at a reasonable rate of pay, the federal district court of
Massachusetts ruled that the hearing officer in this case abused his
discretion to require the district to hire the parents' experts for this
purpose.'
K. Issuing Enforcement Orders
H/ROs' enforcement authority has been tested for two
overlapping subjects-private settlements and H/ROs' prior
decisions.15 6  Some H/ROs order the enforcement of private
settlement agreements,157 while other H/ROs interpret the courts'
154. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir 2008); Matanuska-
Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. D.Y., 54 IDELR 52 (D. Alaska 2010).
155. Dracut Sch. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, 737 F. Supp.
2d 35 (D. Mass. 2010). But cf Meza v. Bd. of Educ., 56 IDELR 167 (D.N.M.
2011) (unlawful delegation IEP team authority to consultants).
156. For an analysis of the issue of IDEA settlements generally, see Mark C.
Weber, Settling Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Cases: Making Up Is
Hard to Do, 43 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 641 (2010). For the specific related issue of
whether H/ROs have the authority to determine whether parties' private settlement
agreements are enforceable, which would fit here under declaratory relief, see
Plymouth-Canton Cmty. Sch. v. K.C., 40 IDELR 178, at 736-37 (E.D. Mich.
2003), in which the court upheld the validity of the agreement and expressed no
difficulty with the hearing officer having reached this same conclusion. For the
more remotely related matter of whether hearing officers have jurisdiction to
resume the hearing process and issue resulting relief after the parties settled the
matter during the hearing, see Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 432 v. JH., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1166
(D. Minn. 1998). Finally, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Buckhannon Bd and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't ofHealth and Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001), hearing officers increasingly face the issue of whether
they can and should affirm a private settlement agreement. See, e.g., Rockport
Pub. Sch., 36 IDELR $ 27, at 98-99 (Mass. SEA 2002) (recognizing that a hearing
officer has no authority to award attorneys' fees).
157. See, e.g., Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR T 23, at 60-61 (Tex. SEA
1999) (holding that the petitioner's only remedy lies in enforcing the settlement
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authority as exclusive in this area. 5 8 There is at least limited judicial
support for H/ROs' authority to enforce private settlement
agreements.15 9 In the lead case, D.R. v. East Brunswick Board of
Education,160 the Third Circuit ruled that such agreements are, as a
matter of public policy, enforceable as binding contracts.161 But the
Third Circuit did not address the issue of whether H/ROs have
authority to enforce the agreements. 162 More recently, the federal
district court in Connecticut relied on the D.R. public policy rationale
in ruling that H/ROs have the authority to enforce private settlement
agreements.1 63 Some of the subsequent case law supports with this
view.164 Yet, other courts have concluded that enforcement of such
agreement).
158. See, e.g., Agawam Pub. Sch., 36 IDELR 226, at 989-91 (Mass. SEA
2002) (noting that a Third Circuit opinion regarding the enforceability of a
settlement agreement is limited to the purview of a "court"). The hearing officer in
this case alternatively reasoned that the First Circuit was more likely to follow the
dissenting opinion in D.R., which favored the interest in assessing and vindicating
individual rights over the interest in a speedy and efficient dispute resolution. The
hearing officer cited various supporting First Circuit cases. Id. at 991 n.6 (citing
Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990); David D. v.
Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985); Dep't of Educ. v. Brookline
Sch. Comm. 772 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983)).
159. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
160. 109 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1997); cf Reid v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 41
IDELR 268, at 1138 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (finding successful § 1983 action to enforce
private settlement agreement).
161. 109 F.3d at 898.
162. Id. at 900.
163. Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 32 IDELR 202, at 656 (D. Conn. 2000).
164. State ex. rel. St. Joseph Sch. v. Missouri Dep't of Elementary &
Secondary Educ., 307 S.W.3d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v.
McGee, 979 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (ruling that H/RO had jurisdiction
to decide whether settlement agreement existed and, if so, whether either party
failed to comply with it); cf T.G. v. Palm Springs Unified Sch. Dist., 304 F. App'x
548 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring exhaustion); J.M.C. v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary
& Secondary Educ., 584 F. Supp. 2d 894 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (requiring exhaustion
when settlement agreement not made during mediation or resolution session). In a
decision that tangentially addressed H/RO authority in this area, a federal district
court ruled that FAPE, rather than the contempt standard, applies to determine
whether either party breached a settlement agreement. E.D. v. Enter. City Bd. of
Educ., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1259 (M.D. Ala. 2003). The connection is that the
issue arose, in the court's description, "where a hearing officer dismisses a request
for a due process hearing and issues an order adopting a settlement agreement." Id.
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an agreement constitutes a breach of contract claim and therefore
falls exclusively within judicial jurisdiction.16 5 Finally, OSEP has
taken the position that since the IDEA does not address this matter,
states may adopt their own rules regarding an H/RO's authority to
enforce FAPE settlements that do not result from mediation or
resolution meetings, so long as those rules are not limited to IDEA
disputes.166
As a related but separate matter, limited case law suggests that
hearing officers have the authority to provide consent decree status to
a settlement for purposes of attorneys' fees, but only upon proper
order.167
For enforcement of prior H/RO decisions, typically arising when
a school district has allegedly failed to implement the prior H/RO's
order, the prevailing view is that the appropriate forums are the state
complaint resolution process' 68 and, alternatively, the courts,169 rather
165. H.C. v. Pierrepont Cent. Sch. Dist., 341 F. App'x 687 (2d Cir. 2009); Sch
Bd. of Lee County v. M.C., 35 IDELR 273, at 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); cf
L.M. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 55 IDELR 275 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (ruling that
federal courts lack jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements reached outside
the IDEA's mediation and resolution-session process).
166. Letter to Shaw, 50 IDELR 207 (OSEP 2007). The agency added that
such situations trigger each state's complaint resolution process the extent that the
complaint alleges that the failure to provide the services or placement called for in
a settlement agreement constitutes a denial of FAPE, Id.
167. Compare A.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 77 (2d
Cir. 2005) (ordering attorneys' fees because the plaintiff-appellees received court-
ordered consent decrees and there was a material alteration of the legal relationship
such that they were "prevailing parties" under the IDEA), with Maria C. v. Sch.
Dist. of Philadelphia, 43 IDELR 243, at 1169-70 (3d Cir. 2005) (refusing to order
attorneys' fees because there was no material alteration of the legal relationship of
the parties).
168. See, e.g., Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 223 F.3d 1026,
1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR T
115 (N.Y. SEA 2006); Crown Point Cent. Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR T 269 (N.Y. SEA
2006); Newtown Bd. of Educ., 41 IDELR 201, at 827 (Conn. SEA 2004). But cf
Lake Travis Indep. Sch. Dist. v. M.L., 50 IDELR 105 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(allowing H/RO enforcement based on state law). However, parents need not
exhaust the state's complaint resolution process before seeking judicial
enforcement of an H/RO order. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 307 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th
Cir. 2002).
169. The prevailing view is that the appropriate, if not exclusive, avenue to
enforce an H/RO decision is via a §1983 action in court. See, e.g., Jeremy H. v.
35
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than the H/RO process.' 70
L. Issuing Disciplinary Sanctions
The authority of hearing officers to issue disciplinary sanctions
against either party or the party's legal counsel is a controversial
question. Pointing out that the IDEA requires each state education
agency (SEA) to ensure that H/ROs have the authority to grant the
relief necessary for dispute resolution, the IDEA's administering
agency has opined that the answer to this question is a matter of state
law.171 In a Michigan case, a hearing officer ordered parents'
counsel to pay a district's costs (amounting to $306) based on the
parents' counsel's "unexcusable failure to communicate with the
District's counsel in a timely fashion." 72 Questionably assuming
that such authority was automatically derivative, the hearing officer
cited a case in which a court exercised such authority under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17 3 In a Texas case, a hearing
officer dismissed a case with prejudice, concluding that a parent and
the parent's attorney had engaged in "sanctionable conduct" by filing
and dismissing the same special education due process request on
four separate occasions as a means to manipulate the hearing settings
and abuse the hearing process.174
The review officer and court decisions concerning H/ROs'
Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1996); Dominique L. v. Bd.
of Educ. of City of Chicago, 56 IDELR 65 (N.D. Ill. 2011); L.J. v. Audubon Bd.
of Educ., 47 IDELR 100 (D.N.J. 2006); cf Reid v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 41
IDELR $ 268, at 1138 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (enforcing a compensatory education
remedy under settlement agreement through § 1983 action). However, this avenue
may be only open to parents, not districts. See, e.g., Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Buskirk,
950 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
170. For the related issue of whether an H/RO has the jurisdiction to reopen
the case upon the request of either party for enforcement purposes, see Bd. ofEduc.
ofEllenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 337 (N.Y. SEA 1998).
171. Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303 (OSEP 1997) (stating that the
remedies that H/ROs must have available to them are a matter of state law).
172. Bd. of Educ. of Hillsdale Cmty. Sch., 32 IDELR 162, at 511 (Mich.
SEA 1999).
173. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 23 IDELR 1041 (S.D. Tex. 1995),
affd with reduced amount, 118 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1997).
174. Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 IDELR 1 124, at 553 (Tex. SEA 2004).
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authority to order financial or other sanctions against parties or their
attorneys are scant and somewhat surprising. In Indiana, which is a
two-tier state, a review officer upheld a hearing officer's authority to
issue a financial sanction of $500 for "sham objections" and
egregious delays.' 75 While clarifying that the sanction applied to the
parents' attorney, the review officer found the requisite authority in
state law.176  Citing this Indiana decision, a hearing officer in
Minnesota, which is a one-tier state where administrative law judges
serve as hearing officers, ordered a parent's attorney to pay $2,000 to
the school district as a disciplinary sanction "for pursuing a
[summary judgment] motion without sufficient factual or legal
basis." 77 The Minnesota hearing officer reasoned that his statutory
responsibility to conduct hearings and the state's equivalent of Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly supported his
authority to issue sanctions.178 Significantly albeit separately, the
federal district court in Minnesota subsequently upheld such
sanctioning authority when a hearing officer ordered another parent's
attorney to pay $2,432 as a sanction for filing a frivolous fourth
hearing request.179 The court concluded that the hearing officer's
authority to issue sanctions for frivolous hearing conduct was
encompassed within the state regulation that granted hearing officers
the authority to "do the additional things necessary to comply" with
said regulations. 80
In contrast, a review officer in New Mexico recently ruled that
under that state's law, a hearing officer does not even have the
authority to recommend that a court sanction noncompliant parents
by requiring them to pay the district's attorneys' fees.' 8 ' However, in
dicta, the review officer noted that the 2004 amendments to the
IDEA, which did not apply in this case, provided courts with the
175. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 21 IDELR 423, 426 (Ind. SEA 1994).
176. Id.
177. Dist. City 1 & Dist. City 2 Pub. Sch., 24 IDELR 1081 (Minn. SEA
1996).
178. Id. at 1086.
179. Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, 32 IDELR 90, at 283 (D. Minn.
2000); see also K.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (upholding a hearing officer's sanctions against parent's attorney).
180. Moubry, 32 IDELR at 284.
181. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 44 IDELR 1205, at 1073 (N.M. SEA 2005).
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authority to award attorneys' fees to districts in certain
circumstances. 182  The review officer also commented, rather
ambiguously, that "under current law, administrative officers and
courts are permitted to take into account Parents' lack of cooperation
with the District in determining whether Parents are entitled to fees
should they prevail in a due process proceeding .. ."183
Straddling the fence, an Ohio appeals court concluded that H/ROs
are entitled to "implied powers similar to those of a court," but that
the review officer's dismissal of the parents' case with prejudice,
based on their failure to comply with the order to submit the child's
medical and psychological records, was too harsh a sanction.184
Similarly, the federal district court in New Jersey recently reversed a
hearing officer's dismissal based on a pro se parent's lack of
compliance with state filing requirements, concluding that a lesser
form of dismissal would be a more appropriate remedy.'
M Issuing Other Injunctive Relief
H/ROs have issued a rather remarkable range of other injunctions
that have not been tested by subsequent review. Examples include
(1) an Arkansas hearing officer's order that a school principal have
no further contact with a student;186 (2) another Arkansas hearing
officer's order that parents reimburse a district for the cost of an
inexcusably cancelled evaluation appointment;'18 (3) a California
hearing officer's order that parents, who had joint custody but
disagreed about their child's education, obtain a family court ruling
as to which parent had final educational decisionmaking authority;'88
182. Id. at 1070.
183. Id. at 1073. The review officer cited the IDEA regulation for attorneys'
fees, which accords courts, not H/ROs, such authority. Id.
184. Stancourt v. Worthington City Sch. Dist., 841 N.E.2d 812, 830-31 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2005).
185. D.A. v. Haworth Bd. of Educ., 53 IDELR 1 125 (D.N.J. 2009).
186. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 288, at 1175 (Ark. SEA 2001).
The specific scope of the contact was with regard to discipline.
187. Williford Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 298, at 30 (Ark. SEA 1998).
188. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR T 53, at 151-52 (Cal. SEA
1999). This remedy was arguably during the hearing and, if so, beyond the scope
of this Article.
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and (4) a Pennsylvania review panel's decision ordering a district to
provide a parent counseling and training.189
Conversely, some H/RO decisions that have denied injunctive
authority are similarly open to question.190  For example, a
Pennsylvania review panel ruled that it lacked authority to order an
extended school day.191 It is unclear, however, how to distinguish
such relief from an extended school year, which is within the range
of IDEA entitlements.192 Similarly, a Michigan hearing officer
summarily ruled that she did not have authority to order
accommodations on a college entrance examination; although she did
not provide a direct rationale, her ruling is only supportable to the
extent that the student's graduation was bona fide. 193 In a more
marginal example, a Massachusetts hearing officer renounced
authority to require a student to attend school after the student had
reached the state-mandated maximum age, limiting the remedy to a
declaration that the district offered the student FAPE and a strong
recommendation that the student and the parent discontinue the
student's nonattendance.194
189. Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 320 (Pa. SEA 1998). But cf
Wilkes-Barre Area Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR 17, at 40-41 (Pa. SEA 1999) (requiring
parental consent before the District could provide parent training and counseling).
190. Others, however, appear to be not only pragmatically, but also legally
sound. See, e.g., Marlin Indep. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 285, 289 (Tex. SEA 1998)
(disclaiming H/RO authority to discipline or terminate school personnel or to
guarantee district employment for the parents); Ludington Area Sch., 20 IDELR
211, 212 (Mich. SEA 1993) (renouncing H/RO authority regarding the
appointment of one aide over another qualified individual).
191. Abington Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR 149, at 233-34 (Pa. SEA 2003).
192. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2009); 34 C.F.R. § 300.106 (2009). A
possible distinction, which was not clearly discussed in the panel's opinion, is
whether the particular student met the applicable standard, which appears to be
necessity rather than appropriateness. See, e.g., Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR
223, at 906 (Pa. SEA 2004).
193. Fenton Area Pub. Sch., 44 IDELR $ 293, at 1492 (Mich. SEA 2005).
The IDEA regulations would appear to cover such accommodations under its IEP
transition, if not testing provisions. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.347(a)(5), 300.347(b) (2009).
Nevertheless, the hearing officer's ultimate conclusion was that the child was not
eligible, thus making her ruling merely dicta. 44 IDELR 293, at 1499.
194. Tewksbury Pub. Sch., 43 IDELR $ 148, at 656 (Mass. SEA 2005). This
case is problematic because of the general complexity and confusion with regard to
transfer of rights. See generally, Deborah Rebore & Perry Zirkel, Transfer of
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Other open questions concern an H/RO's authority to order a
SEA to take action. The IDEA's administering agency has opined
that such authority depends on state law, but it added that authority
may be implicated in certain circumstances by the SEA's general
supervisory authority under IDEA.195 Finally, the 2004 IDEA
reauthorization directly addressed H/ROs' injunctive authority in
tandem with limiting H/ROs' finding of denial of FAPE based on
procedural violations. Specifically, after identifying the three limited
situations for such a finding, the amended IDEA provides: "Nothing
in this [limitation provision] shall be construed to preclude a hearing
officer from ordering a local education agency to comply with
procedural requirements. . . ."196 Thus, while limiting the H/RO's
decisionmaking authority, the amendments constitute the first time
that the IDEA expressly recognizes the remedial authority of H/ROs.
Thus far, very few court decisions have limited HROs' authority
to issue other injunctive relief. In one, Pennsylvania's intermediate,
appellate court ruled that an H/RO lacks authority to require the
district to provide the parent with a translated transcript, concluding
that the hearing officer policy manual does not have the force of
regulations, i.e., law.197 In a second such case, a federal district court
reversed a hearing officer's order that effectively replaced the IEP
team with the private company that implemented the child's home-
based program, concluding that this arrangement would constitute a




Although the IDEA expressly grants courts the authority to award
Rights Under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act: Adulthood With
Ability or Disability?, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 33.
195. Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303 (OSEP 1997).
196. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(F)).
197. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. v. Zhou, 976 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2009).
198. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.S., 688 F. Supp. 2d 883 (D. Alaska 2010).
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attorneys' fees,199 courts have construed the accompanying statutory
silence as implying that H/ROs do not have concomitant authority. 200
In the commentary accompanying the IDEA regulations, the
administering agency has added a potential exception-in which state
law so specifies. 20 1 In the absence of such state law,202 H/ROs have
consistently followed the judicial interpretation that attorneys' fees
are within the court's exclusive domain. 203  The 2004 IDEA
amendment that provides for awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing
state or local education agencies in limited circumstances does so
expressly within the same discretionary authority of courts. 204
Nevertheless, as an incidental intersection, an H/RO's remedy
may have an effect on whether a court determines that a parent is
entitled to attorneys' fees. For example, an H/RO recently upheld a
district's proposed placement of a child but concluded that the IEP
was not sufficiently specific with regard to mainstreaming
opportunities at said placement and ordered the IEP team to meet to
revise the IEP.205 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the parent had only
199. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2009); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517 (2009). Oddly,
the legislation explicitly includes the hearing officer in the accompanying
prohibition for timely offers of settlement. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(III). For
the accompanying regulation, which repeats this language, see 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.517(c)(2)(C).
200. See, e.g., Mr. B. v. E. Granby Bd. of Educ., 201 F. App'x 834 (2d Cir.
2006): Wagner v. Logansport Cmty. Sch. Corp., 990 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Ind.
1997); Mathern v. Campbell County Children's Ctr., 674 F. Supp. 816, 818 (D.
Wyo. 1987).
201. Attachment I, Fed. Reg. 12,615 (Mar. 12, 1999).
202. Although related, the determination of the prevailing party is a separate
matter. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Moreover, an H/RO's
issuance of a settlement order, akin to a consent decree, may have significant effect
on prevailing status for attorneys' fees. See, e.g., A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. New York
City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2005).
203. See, e.g., Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 23 IDELR 287, 289 (Ariz.
SEA 1995); San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 998, 1004 (Cal. SEA 1998);
New Haven Bd. of Educ., 20 IDELR 42, 46 (Conn. SEA 1993); Sch. E. Chicago.,
31 IDELR 45, at 174 (Ind. SEA 1998); In re Student with a Disability, 44 IDELR
115, at 584 (N.M. SEA 2005); Yankton Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 772, 774 (S.D.
SEA 1994); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 670, 677 (Tex. SEA 1998); Seattle
Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 843, 848 (Wash. SEA 1999) (finding the HIRO did not have
authority to award attorneys' fees).
204. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)).
205. Linda T. v. Rice Lake Area Sch. Dist., 417 F.3d 704, 705, 709 (7th Cir.
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attained de minimis success and, thus, did not meet the prevailing
party requirement for attorneys' fees under the IDEA. 206 As another
variation of this intersection, HIROs may have the authority upon
proper order to provide consent decree status to a settlement for
purposes of attorneys' fees.207
B. Awarding Money Damages
Although a minority of courts have taken the view that money
damages are available under the IDEA,208 it is generally accepted that
this form of relief is not within H/ROs' authority.209
C. Making Strong Recommendations for District Action
A final category of marginal limitations is that H/ROs may only
make strong recommendations that the defendant-district take certain
action in the wake of an H/RO's decision in the district's favor.210
Given the appearance of forceful authority of H/ROs, such dicta are
questionable from a purist point of view, 211 though some courts have
appeared to endorse this directive guidance. 212
2005); E.S. v. Skidmore Tynan Indep. Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR 40 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
(unrequested relief).
206. Linda T., 417 F.3d at 709.
207. Compare A.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.
2005), with Maria C. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 43 IDELR 243, at 1170 (3d
Cir. 2005); cf Sanford v. Sylvania City Sch. Bd., 380 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ohio
2005).
208. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995); Baldwin
County Bd. of Educ., 39 IDELR 57, at 1383 (Ala. SEA 2003); Tucson Unified
Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 1037 (Ariz. SEA 1998); Bridgeport Bd. of Educ., 28 IDELR
1043 (Conn. SEA 1998); Fenton Area Pub. Sch., 44 IDELR $ 293, at 1499 (Mich.
SEA 2005); Marlin Indep. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 285 (Tex. SEA 1998); Seattle Sch
Dist., 29 IDELR 843 (Wash. SEA 1999) (holding that an H/RO does not have
authority to order compensatory damages); cf Cinnaminson Twp. Bd. of Educ., 26
IDELR 1378 (N.J. SEA 1997) (same with regard to punitive damages).
210. See, e.g., Farmington Pub. Sch., 36 IDELR 109, at 473 (Mich. SEA
2001).
211. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 36; see also Forer v. Warrior Run Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR
450, 452 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
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CONCLUSION
With the exception of money damages and attorneys' fees,
H/ROs are generally not cognizant or consistent with regard to the
boundaries of their remedial authority. The language of the IDEA
and its regulations are not particularly helpful in this regard, but a
growing body of published administrative and case law provides
useful and enforceable demarcations that warrant careful
consideration by H/ROs and other interested individuals. The
addition of qualifications for H/ROs in the IDEA reauthorization-
concerning H/ROs' knowledge and ability to understand special
education law, to conduct hearings, and to "render and write
decisions"2 1 3-appears to reinforce the need for H/ROs to be aware
of and to act in conformance with the limits on their remedial
powers. The codification of the applicable authority, including the
boundaries for H/ROs, merits not only the attention of Congress-
which has neglected this important area of policymaking as a
foundation for state variation-but also customized elaboration in
state special education statutes and regulations.
213. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)).
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